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Kant after Kant: the Indispensable Philosopher 
Michael Vater 
         ”He.  You know how it has been for me with Kant.  Surely  
     the whole history of a philosophical system does not belong  
     to its concept. There would be no end to it in that case. 
         I.  No beginning, you mean. 
        --Friedrich Jacobi, David Hume on Faith1 
 
Many of Kant’s readers have felt the urge not only to excise conceptual items and arguments they find 
otiose but to plainly revise Kant’s plan and rewrite his arguments. One example is Strawson’s effort to 
read the extravagance of transcendental idealism out of the First Critique and put in its place a more 
“austere” account of the objectivity of experience.2 Others seems to think Kant stands as a fixed beacon 
with whose help one can navigate contemporary philosophical debates. Wilfred Sellars maintains there 
are enough similarities between problems facing Kant and the tools he used to solve them and issues 
and instruments available to the contemporary philosopher to make Kant relevant, and not just as a 
means of communication. “In their most general aspect both his problems and our perplexities spring 
from the attempt to take both man and science seriously.”3  Yet it is peculiar to the experience of 
seriously reading Kant to ask, perhaps more seriously than Jacobi, whether our reading takes on Kant at 
the beginning of the Critical task or at its systematic end. 
 
This chapter will explore three themes that, taken together, secure Kant’s continuing relevance for both 
Anglo-American and European traditions of philosophy. The first is simple: Kant continues to be relevant 
in the history of philosophy because he invented the genre. He wrote the script for Modern European 
philosophy, framing its questions about the reliability of perceptions and the origin of conceptual 
frameworks to match the solutions his critical idealism in supplied. He sorted the disputes and 
disputants of age of new science into ‘brands’ or tribes—dogmatists and skeptics, materialists and 
dualists, empiricists and idealists—so he could take the middle ground and pacify the warring parties. 
History is not generated by the accumulation of evidence or documents, but by the superimposition of a 
narrative or point of view.   
 
The second contribution is more difficult to formulate. Before Kant, metaphysics and epistemology were 
consumed by questions of what lay outside the bounds of sense and understanding-- whether 
perception and its psychosomatic components delivered merely what Descartes called ‘objective reality’ 
(the being of a mental state) or communicated something that exists independent of us, Descartes’ 
‘formal reality’—and whether our cognitive faculties reached beyond experience to secure knowledge of 
supersensible items such as God, enduring soul, and free will. After Kant philosophy becomes agnostic 
about external items—even about ‘things’--and restricts its attention to what is experienced. This ‘inner 
space’ gets variously named and renamed transcendental subjectivity, subject-objectivity, 
phenomenology, intersubjectivity, ordinary language, communicative action, and social construction. 
What all the labels try to figure is the intra-experiential and multi-centric character of human reality. As 
philosophy unfolds after Kant, the cognizing/acting subject is viewed not as the isolated item designated 
by first-person descriptors, but as a universal multiply instantiated across all social domains-- ethics, 
science, culture, education, etc. Even the moral law, though formally a universal which determines a 
single will, involves confronting other rational beings, their wills and their welfare. In the wake of Kant’s 
dawning realization that the space of reason is social or multi-centric, contemporary explorations of 
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cognition, affect and communication underscore the social nature of intelligence even as they illustrate 
its biological history and neurological complexity. 
 
Kant’s third contribution is less distinctive; he shares in broader currents of European thought variously 
called Enlightenment, or humanism, or political liberalism. Although he isolates philosophy from other 
endeavors when doing history of philosophy, Kant was an eager participant in a broader conversation 
that included scientists, writers, and public intellectuals. His contribution here lies in the way he 
uncharacteristically avoids definitions and frames the project of humanism as “the question of the 
human being.” What will resonate with philosophers in succeeding ages is the primacy of the question 
and the urgency of redesigning the customs and institutions—pedagogical, cultural, economic, and 
political—that make the people who live within them. Pointedly turning his back on vertical models of 
religion, Kant saw that humans have the task of designing human reality and deciding what it shall be. Of 
course he harbored essentialist tendencies. He conflated ‘reason’ with abstract logical values like 
universality and necessity, which seemed to support beliefs that human reality is biologically one and its 
members morally equal by nature. But in this area, his agenda was pragmatic, not critical; in any social-
political setting less coercive than theocracy or totalitarianism, one must design institutions to introduce 
human beings into their rational and social capacities. 
 
In what follows, I selectively discuss some philosophers and philosophies that illustrate these 
contentions. The chapter’s title, with its use of ‘indispensable’, is meant to be provocative; it suggests 
we could not understand ourselves, or at least our philosophies, if we didn’t deeply study Kant. The 
rhetoric suggests a transcendental argument, and one recent development in Kantian and post-Kantian 
philosophy is the probing of this form of argument with its seeming capacity to prove everything on a 
nonevidential basis.4 I regret that I cannot touch upon late nineteenth century developments in 




Kant did not come to his narrative about modern philosophy without struggle, and his process toward 
that narrative as well as the path to his own critical philosophy remains hidden in the ‘silent decade’ 
devoted to the composition of the Critique. Much of what we can infer about it comes from minor 
publications such as the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770, the statement in the 1783 Prolegomena that he 
was wakened from “dogmatic slumber” by the reading of Hume, and the attempt to mediate the 
Mendelssohn-Jacobi conflict over Spinoza in the 1786 essay “What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in 
Thinking?” In 1770, Kant is an idealist in the mold of Leibniz whose mistrust of the senses is 
overbalanced by confidence that intellect can employ logical and mathematical concepts to construct a 
metaphysics and also deploy concepts “critically” to prevent the application of sensible predicates to 
supersensible realities.  
 
Let us turn to the Critique and review its resolution of the warring positions in modern philosophy, the 
most interesting of which are found in earlier version of the Paralogisms, the Antinomies, and the 
Refutation of Idealism added in the B edition. In the first, Kant argues that it is the nature of reason to 
assume antithetic positions on matters incapable of experiential exhibition and inspection, especially on 
the nature of the subject. Spiritualism, the untutored conviction that I am a thinking thing, is the initial 
or natural position, but Kant calls it a slumbering imaginary conviction, even the “euthanasia of pure 
reason.” If one doesn’t dreamily depart for unknown regions, the alternatives of dogmatism and 
skepticism awaken-- the first attempts to use concepts of reason to argue that the I that appears in 
cognition is a thinking substance, to which skepticism replies there is no theoretical way of fixing or 
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evaluating the appearance of the internal narrator and narrative (A 406-407/B433-434). Note that Kant 
consider two alternatives in this passage: (a) either one will let conventional notions rule one’s life and 
let ordinary language rule when reason ought to, or (b) reason can awaken, but straightaway falls into 
antithetical positions. 
 
Kant offers his clearest definition of transcendental idealism in the first version of the Fourth 
Paralogism. The idealist is not one who denies the reality of external objects, but one who unable to 
overcome all doubts about external reality and so remains locked in her ideas; it is likely that Kant is 
considering Descartes here. The realist is insecure, however, for as much as one believes one’s 
perceptions are the real characters of thing, one cannot get outside them and to the nature of thing. 
The transcendental idealist can admit the appearances in space and time which she perceives are 
dependent on our sensibility (and so cannot be referred to external objects apart from that form of 
representation) while they yet function as actual things, directly perceived and not inferred, and so 
support empirical realism.  Within representation, one can be certain that I am as real as the objects 
that I perceive (A368-370). 
 
The second edition of the Critique adds a Refutation of Idealism, in which Kant argues that 
transcendental idealism is the only appropriate response to Descartes’ problematic idealism—
problematic in that Descartes’ thought started with universal doubt and idealistic in that the doubt is 
resolved into the self-certifying idea of the cogito: whatever my mental state, if I have one I know I am.  
What problematic idealism really does is pose the demand for a rational warrant for the reality of 
external things, that we not just imagine, but experience them. And ‘experience’ implies the existence of 
objects in space outside me is just as real as my consciousness of them (B274-275).  Of course there are 
problems here; in underscoring the correlation between the unity of consciousness and the objectivity 
of the object in appearances, Kant may have said too much about the actuality of objects to continuing 
talking about thing-in-themselves. 
 
This passage is Kant’s sole but oblique reference to Descartes as the originator of modern philosophy, 
not the one who promoted the false light of the cogito, but the one who (on the basis of some slight but 
manageable doubts about the veracity of perceptions) decided to call everything into doubt until he 
could find an Archimedean point of certainty. It was Descartes who moved the question from quid facti? 
to quid juris?, from the correctness of isolated perceptions to the justification of knowledge as a whole. 
It was Descartes who first summoned reason to court to answer for itself, and after him came a 
procession of unreliable witnesses who advanced partial answers which were really only responses to 
quid facti questions—the clarity and distinctness of ideas, or the vivacity and force of sense impression.  
When Kant steps forward and shows that what is at issue is the normative reach of reason or the 
legitimacy of our cognitive frameworks, he finds he can organize the half-truths of idealism and realism, 
skepticism and dogmatism, and spiritualism and materialism into a complete case for the objectivity of 
experiential knowledge—if one but grant the initially counter-intuitive (or semi-skeptic) distinction 
between appearances conditioned by our form of sensibility and things-in-themselves which can be 
conceived but never experienced. Kant therefore fashioned the history of modern philosophy in coming 
to his own philosophy.  Reason had been in the court of its own making for some two centuries before 
Kant stepped in to make closing arguments and read the verdict, which includes a partial vindication of 
all of the evidential claims the witnesses advanced. But the vindication of the claims to objectivity and 
necessity advanced by experiential knowledge in toto was the work of the process as a whole.   
 





Justifying Cognitive Frameworks 
 
First responders: Three works published in the Critique’s first decade illustrate how Kant’s initial readers 
struggled with the work. They all omit or revise elements in Kant’s doctrine, hoping to clarify the 
argument or eliminate unthinkable suppositions. Two of the three give Kant’s cognitive paradigm a fair 
reading, but none is willing to accept Kant’s conclusion about the impossibility of a supersensible 
metaphysics.   
 
Friedrich Jacobi had argued with Moses Mendelssohn for years about the threat of Spinozism, or the 
relative competence of faith and reason to assess religious matters, when Kant intervened in 1786 with 
his Orienting Oneself in Thinking essay. He suggested that a heuristic use of reason to foster rational 
belief in matters philosophically undecidable was appropriate, but also repudiated Jacobi’s use of quotes 
from his own pronouncements on faith and reason. Jacobi’s 1787 David Hume on Faith, or Idealism and 
Realism brought Kant directly into the controversy. While Jacobi previously advocated recourse to a 
blind faith to resolve doubts that Spinoza raised, he moderates the wildness of that position (which Kant 
deemed enthusiasm) and turns to Hume’s indirect way of resolving skeptical problems by relying on 
convention or everyday belief.5 In a supplement, Jacobi raises the issue of Kant’s transcendental 
idealism and its inclusion of reference to a thing in itself. After extensively citing the Fourth Paralogism 
and the Transcendental Aesthetic, Jacobi confesses perplexity about how we can know anything about 
things of which we are utterly ignorant, but still contend that we have objective knowledge of sensible 
things in experience. For his part, he cannot conceive of knowledge of objects in any way other than 
through sense impressions from external objects. He is candid about adopting this supposition without 
philosophical inspection, and remarks that with it he can at least enter the Critique, though retaining it 
he cannot remain within it.6  Di Giovanni notes that Jacobi failed to see the systematic importance of the 
thing-in-itself as the marker of the finite or contingent nature of human reason.7 
 
After Kant’s warmly received his letters on the cultural and religious significance of the Critique (see 
below p. 12). Karl Reinhold turned to a systematic exposition of Kantian philosophy in his 1789 Essay on 
a New Theory of the Human Capacity for Representation. Not widely studied today, his contribution is 
often mentioned as a defense of the thing-in-itself or a first attempt at a wholly foundationalist 
philosophy.8 It is these things, but Reinhold’s intention was not merely to recast the presentation of the 
Critique, but to expand its explanatory basis to hook outlier features such as the thing-in-itself more 
deeply into its fabric. His vehicle is an extended account of “representation,” a mental state prior to 
consciousness or cognition. I prefer to translate Vorstellung as ‘mental state’, for I fear we usually think 
Kant’s ‘representation’ is an item (already) in consciousness.  
 
Reinhold argues that we must insert the presence of a mental state at the beginning of the account of 
cognition if we care to explain consciousness, sensibility, understanding and desire.9 A mental state has 
rudimentary properties such as reference to an object and a subject, a capacity to be affected and 
spontaneity.10 Consciousness has properties similarly named, but since consciousness is a mental state 
that is a relation of mental states, its higher-level gesture to subject and object and its way of joining 
spontaneity and being-affected are sui generis .11 Kant’s theory gives one no right to drag in the arbitrary 
supposition that every objector seems to require: that there is some property-similarity between 
sensations/perceptions and things-in-themselves. By having a mental state as the primitive item in the 
account, but one that is preconscious, a Kantian can maintain there is an objective something 
underneath our cognition, but avoid Jacobi’s mistaken idea that a representation must copy or re-
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present external features.12 If it lacks a two-layered framework of explanation, transcendental idealism 
deflates into simple realism and returns us to the skeptical perplexities realism always faces. 
 
Reinhold offers a fairly standard interpretation of the rest of Kant’s Analytic, except for this explanation 
of how imagination’s synthesis underlies the pure concepts of the understanding. Reinhold offers an 
image of synthesis that doesn’t depend on distinctions among types of propositions and logical 
judgments, arguing that at the primitive level of the mental state, spontaneity is joined with being- 
affected the way unitary form is imposed on a material manifold.13 Fichte incorporates this feature of 
Reinhold’s account and makes it the basic unit of activity of world-construction depicted by the 
Wissenschaftslehre: feeling, or the active register of being-affected. 
 
Though Reinhold gives careful attention to the reconstruction of the Analytic, there is no Dialectic, since 
he does not agree with Kant that reason is inherently dialectical. Reason is intrinsically reliable; there is 
no reason to mistrust the extension concepts into metaphysical domains.14 But it can fashion erroneous 
theories, and when mistakes are made—as they were made by both empiricists and idealists before 
Kant—they are made by philosophers who fail to observe carefully, who confuse ontological and 
epistemic issues, and jump levels. Pre-Kantian philosophy’s failed attempt to explain cognition arose 
from its failure to notice the mental state underneath the sensation, perception or concept. Self-
undermining versions of realism and idealism, materialism and spiritualism, and dogmatism and 
skepticism resulted from this failure.15 Kant recovered the half-truth of these positions in the Analytic. 
 
Saloman Maimon was self-educated. When he moved into the German world of learning, he changed his 
patronymic (ben Joshua) to honor Maimonides. Indebted to Kant’s friends Mendelssohn and Herz for his 
entry into Berlin society, his Essay on Transcendental Philosophy was presented to Kant by Herz before 
publication in 1790. Replete with mathematical examples, it challenged some of Kant’s key assumptions 
from a Leibnizean-Wolffian perspective. 
 
Maimon understood the principle of Kant’s philosophy from its fundamental decision to place the 
question of lawfulness (quid juris?) of cognition ahead of subsidiary questions about sensation, 
perception, concepts and judgment and their correctness. From the start, however, Maimon contests 
key elements in the Kantian philosophy:  
 
• He finds difference between analytic and synthetic propositions puzzling, for synthetic 
propositions are just ones incompletely analyzed or understood by finite minds. 
• Although the question of normative necessity (quid juris?) opens the path to systematic 
philosophy and one can conceive how a priori concepts can apply to empirical intuitions, the 
relation of a priori concepts to a priori intuitions is obscure. 
• Intuition must attach to a material manifold, so metaphysics must include a new kind of idea, an 
“idea of the understanding”—a material counterpart to Kant’s formal ideal of reason. 
• Kant’s answer to Hume’s skepticism is unconvincing.16 
 
Maimon breaks with Kant by placing reality or ontology ahead of epistemology. The material of 
intuitions is not unknowable qualities, but ‘differentials’ or nonextended point-realities, like Leibniz’s 
petites perceptions in magnitude, but not miniature minds; Maimon also calls them “ideas of the 
understanding” or “noumena.” They are swarming and evanescent in nature, so understanding must 
capture them as they arise and transform them into intuitions.17One stage of the process is the grouping 
together of these items into space and time, which are not (as Kant said) pure a priori intuitions but 
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unities created from manifolds. Since they are constructed and not given a priori, space and time are 
intuitions, but lack self-certifying necessity and universality.18 
 
Kant responded to Maimon’s criticisms in a letter to Herz on 26 May, 1789. By making synthetic 
propositions variants of analytic ones, Maimon moves close to ascribing an intuitive intellect to human 
beings. His difficulty about how a priori concepts combine with a priori intuitions is easily solved; such a 
synthesis obtains only in the context of experience, and its upshot applies only to appearances, not to 
things-in-themselves.19 Maimon replied in a journal article that although Kant and he agreed that 
metaphysics was concerned with knowledge of things in themselves, Kant thinks that it is a null set and 
metaphysics is no science, while he thinks that metaphysics is the science of the elements or end-
members of the series of appearances, i.e., of the elemental differentials or ideas of the 
understanding.20 
 
Constructing freedom:  Reinhold’s citadel of Kantian studies at Jena became, even in Kant’s lifetime, the 
center of efforts to transform Criticism into a distinctive philosophical system, initially called the 
Wissenschaftslehre--or Transcendental Idealism—by J. G. Fichte, later Objective or Absolute Idealism by 
F. W. J. Schelling and G. W. F. Hegel. Although each of three allowed himself to get ensnared in debates 
with other figures, at the core of the movement was a decision to rescue key Kantian insights from the 
epistemic preoccupations that occasioned their formulation and to exhibit them as reason’s positive 
work in the natural and human worlds. Among the idealists’ key assumptions are: 
 
• Reason’s normative authority extends beyond logical and mathematical domains to exert 
organizing force in nature, science, human society, morals and all the branches of learning. 
• Rationality is powerful and manifests as non-entropic activity—or an edge of spontaneity over 
or limitation in finite contexts. Sometimes this interpreted as the primacy of ethics over 
cognitive rationality. 
• Reason’s systematic character endows its works with universality and necessity. 
• Philosophy’s task is comprehensive explanation, not the solution of specific puzzles or the 
deployment of tightly formulated arguments, but ‘world-construction’-- a total account of intra-
human (or conceptual) reality. 
• Kant’s restrictions on the extent of human knowledge are upheld. Lacking access to things 
beyond experience, transcendental philosophy is agnostic about ontology and unwilling to make 
existence claims. 
 
Kant himself would recognize the items in this list as Kantian, although he might find the fourth inflated 
in its ambition. It is one thing to pose claims that reason is systematic, its structure architectonic, and 
the goal of its explanation a totality of conditions, and quite another to consume thousands of printed 
pages to fabricate total world narratives.  
 
How do the idealists differ from Kant?  Fichte makes three decisive alterations in arguing with Kant and 
his surrogate, Reinhold. (1) If philosophy is to incorporate and argumentatively defend freedom, it must 
take its stance in freedom or activity. It cannot therefore take ‘thing’ as a primitive term; although it 
may justify certain cognitive states as not only factual but necessary, there can be no thing-in-itself. (2) 
The sort of compromised activity-and-being-affected that Reinhold used to mark the mental state 
contained too much being-affected and too little spontaneity. If representation, along with its gesture to 
an unknowable thing, is eliminated, there is no longer a basis for any sort of realism, and philosophy 
becomes phenomenalism.  (3) Accordingly, the distinction between consciousness and self-
7 
 
consciousness collapses. Whereas Reinhold argued that self-consciousness depends on consciousness, 
Fichte reverses the account: consciousness is possible only on the basis of a self-consciousness that 
allow direct access to the self-realizing activity that is the I, in a founding intuition he calls intellectual 
intuition.21  Schelling and Hegel make similar moves and their philosophies too become descriptive or 
phenomenological, claiming privileged intuition or methodological transparency as anchors in lieu of 
objectivity.22 
 
It is difficult to see how the resulting philosophies are Kantian, even if they call themselves 
Transcendental Idealism, for Fichte and his successors simply walk away from Kant’s problem of the 
legitimacy of human cognitive structures. In defense of a freedom which Kant himself found difficult to 
define and defend, they simply jump into a postulated original activity--or productivity (Schelling) or 
thinking (Hegel)23—and consider that they succeed if from this postulate and a series of limitations or 
dialectical reversals, they can finally approximate the situation of a finite human knower/agent in a 
world of incompletely known things, among them other entities claiming also to be free subjects. But 
the strategy of the argument is Kantian—one colossal transcendental argument. 
 
If the idealists’ strategy is simple—assume activity, productive power, or a thinking that is creative, not 
merely reproductive, and whittle it down to finite size by having  it create its own limitations-- the task it 
sets itself is difficult. Fichte succeeds, to some extent, for in the practical part of the first version of the 
Wissenschaftslehre (we might call it moral psychology today) he can point to drive and feeling as the 
first place where the I’s limited activity (striving) is concretized. Instead of the dry logical clash of self-
positing and not-self-positing which theoretical philosophy presents, the affective realm reveals a point 
where spontaneity is directly joined to being-affected, where will in its primordial self-active state shows 
up as pre-directed to a specified state.24 Reinhold makes similar moves, portraying representation as an 
indissoluble knot of activity and passivity, as impossible to observe as is the eye’s seeing,25 and locates a 
self-presenting active state when desire arises as drive, an orientation which seems to be a choice 
already made.26 Fichte looks at the same phenomena but interprets them differently, for he finds 
dynamic phenomena (striving vis à vis counter-striving, drive, and feeling) at the basis of consciousness. 
Tensed activity is primary; representation and cognitive states are subsequently generated by this 
primordial conflict.27For Kant and Reinhold, the human’s preeminent capacity is cognitive, while willing 
(the power of for desire) is secondary and dependent; for Fichte, activity is prior and all phenomena 
which arise for us as ‘mind’ are but alterations of underlying psychodynamics. 
 
I have suggested the post-Kantians’ basic endeavor is world construction or encyclopedia description of 
human reality. But one can argue they had a more limited aim: to confirm the small share of freedom 
Kant believed he had saved after he conceded the universal sway of causal determination to Spinoza (in 
the Third Antinomy).  Yet this is not what they achieve, for they typically posit unlimited activity, 
productivity, or expressive power as first principle, discover a feature in that activity which undermines 
or limits it, and deduce all the limitations of that principle, until the construction accumulates all the 
conditions which make human reason a contingent or merely social-historical phenomenon. If the 
(transcendental) form of argument is admissible, the argument is correct, for it returns us to the very 
forms of reason and freedom we experience in ourselves and our social and natural environments. 
 
But if the idealists’ arguments merely return us to the Third Antinomy, what is the point? The point is 
descriptive and stays quite within the Kantian pattern of articulating the conditions of our experiential 
cognition and finite action, although the idealists employ the illusory rhetoric of transcendence to 
suggest that the logical motion of dialectic or genetic deduction gets us somewhere more exalted than 
the next stop on the railroad home from work. The logical push-pull of dialectic just gets the reader from 
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one stop to the next; it takes a conductor (or hermeneutic commentator) to announce where we are—
or to overlay a narrative of human significance upon the journey. The journey is entertaining, if 
fictional—Schelling and Fichte admitted the fictive nature of the start of the system, while Hegel 
maintained it was self-starting28—but what function does it serve? Kant might say the narrative compiles 
the totality of conditions for (limited or human) rationality and action, but it appears as the totality of 
limitations finite existence imposes on the quantum of freedom we started with. We have not left the 
Third Antinomy, though perhaps we learn a Spinozistic lesson on how to enjoy a rational but limited life.  
 
Kant critiqued: In 1818 Arthur Schopenhauer published The World as Will and Representation, with an 
appendix pointing out Kant’s merits and flaws. Dismissing all that happened after Kant as little more 
than common sense inflated by hot air, Schopenhauer selected Kantian topics, and, freeing them from 
their original context of legitimizing experiential knowledge, combined them with spiritual themes from 
Plato, the Vedas, and early Buddhist teachings to form a soteriological system. Logically, Schopenhauer’s 
boldest move is to identify four types of relational concepts—ground and consequent in ‘things’, subject 
and object in ’cognition’, relations of externality and succession in ‘space and time’, and motive and 
decision in ‘psychology’. They are more than analogously related; they are the fourfold root of sufficient 
reason, the dream logic that organizes the human experience and the appearances or objects featured 
in that long dream. That logic brings to light that objects are just appearances and that the rules of 
experience are little more than bins set up to classify and collect similar objects, but it leaves their origin 
and essence totally unexplained, as is seen most clearly in the subject-object relation, which is really all 
about objects and says nothing about the subject.29  
 
Real causes, subjects, motives, or the basis of space and time cannot appear in the unfolding dream 
these relations govern, and any reality they might have besides being placeholders in descriptions of 
appearances would have to be connected to will, Kant’s thing-in-itself reconfigured as a principle of 
activity.  We do not know the dimension of will except in its objectified form, as body--the real-life 
correlate of the Kantian dream, with its interlaced biological, physiological, mechanical and behavioral 
systems.  My body is the representation of will and the vehicle for all other representations, so to say I 
know only appearance is to say I know only as embodied, organic, semi-responsible action.30 The 
ceaselessly productive but not purposive creativity of nature, particularly at lower or inorganic levels, 
indicates the chaotic nature of will; while we knowers and everything we know falls under the principle 
of individuation (location in space and time), will escapes all parameters and knows no measure. If what 
we can cognize must be characterized by spatiotemporal location, causality, persistence and change, will 
lacks all logic and exhibits basic wildness: striving without goal.31 
 
Schopenhauer compounds two other branches of Kant’s thinking into a palliative for the eerie, divided 
state of individual existence: aesthetic and ethics. Aesthetic works and the pleasures which accompany 
their creation and contemplation allow cognitive mind an intuition not bound by the rules of ordinary 
experience and furnish a satisfaction different from the use, consumption or destruction that quotidian 
enjoyments entail. And ethics indicate what mollification, if any, is possible for will in its unsatisfactory, 
multiple and self-destroying objectifications. Will is free, i.e., active and not bound by rules or purposes, 
but my body and its life is quite bound, for I have such and such a character and such and such a 
psychology, find myself in these circumstances, with these desire and fairly limited choices. As 
embodied knowing, I can choose to affirm this trance of will or transcend it by renunciation based on a 
clear cognition of the character of life. This leads one to a recognition of something like the Vedic 





In a lengthy appendix, Schopenhauer praises Kant for three basic moves: his distinction of appearances 
and the thing-in-itself, his assignment of the former to cognition and the latter to ethics, and the 
depiction of the human situation in the Third Antinomy, which consigns all human actions to rule of 
cause and effect but bids us look to another domain for freedom. But he vehemently criticizes the way 
Kant got to the thing-in-itself, citing an Asian proverb that there’s no lotus without a skinny stem and 
stinking pond underneath; Kant could have derived the distinction of thing-in-itself (=will) and 
appearance directly by enlarging Berkeley’s claim: no object without a subject .33 In the Third Antinomy, 
Schopenhauer claims Kant proposed a riddle to which his doctrine of will (the thing-in-itself) is the key. 
But Kant fancied instead that the ground of appearances must be an object of some sort, forgetting that 
one has objects only in experience and that all objects are appearance.34 An even more basic criticism is 
that Kant failed to define reason at the start and only surreptitiously introduced the distinction of 
cognitive and practical reason late in the Critique (A802/B830). Kant there speaks of how theoretical 
reason determines the facts of experience, while practical reason prescribes ought’s; the appropriate 
contrast should have been between the logical must’s governing how appearances are shaped and the 
ought’s of the moral realm.35 
 
Other reactions to the conceptual idealism of the post-Kantians are akin to Schopenhauer’s 
soteriological system. Kierkegaard borrowed concepts from Kant’s thinking but used them to craft an 
apology for religion-- not the universal but hollow theism of the old rational theology, but a vivid way of 
life that involves personal encounter with the divine (or flight from it) as one of life’s options.36 These 
fundamental options or potencies (Schelling’s term) are the aesthetic life of pleasure, the ethical life of 
renunciation, or the religious life of personal encounter with the infinite—each of them governed by 
one of Kant’s modal categories: possibility, necessity, and actuality. What Kant pointedly excluded from 
philosophy’s competence—comprehending existence (while agreeing it is not conceptual) and 
embracing individuality (while shunning universal prescriptions)—is what Kierkegaard includes.37 He 
does this not just conceptually, but makes his life an experiment, writing many works in different 
genres, from varying points of view. Sometimes the author ironically distances himself from his thought 
by posing as editor or commentator on his pseudonymous creations. Schelling too tries to start with 
existence when returns to the lecture hall in Berlin in 1841 in a state-sponsored attempt to lessen the 
influence of Hegel’s conceptualism. In the so-called Positive Philosophy, Schelling deliberately 
intertwines two themes that Kant wanted to exclude--talk of existence and of positive (revealed) religion 
as truth.38 
 
Kant in twentieth-century Anglo-American thought: The sharply different angles described by Anglo-
American theoretical philosophy in the 20th century can be traced to the influence of Wittgenstein’s 
major works. The Tractatus Logioco-philosophicus marked the high-water of philosophers’ faith in logic 
to keep philosophical discourse within Kantian parameters, for the ideal language advanced there had 
the power to represent empirical facts and situations, but excluded other human concerns such as 
ethics and aesthetics which escape formulation into propositions with definite truth values. The only 
‘historical’ philosopher Wittgenstein studied was Schopenhauer, and the latter’s view of the laws of 
experience as a relational net which lets facts swim through and produces only the texture of a dream 
powerfully influenced his formalistic view of logic: a network overlaid upon events that describes only 
the rules of description.39 The direction is reversed in Philosophical Investigations where the hope for all-
embracing formal rules as the mark of reason is abandoned and we are returned to the myriad 
distinctions and inflections of ordinary language to make sense of the world. But wander as we must in 
the bowels of language, we are still in Kantian territory: the interface between subject and object 
where, as Schopenhauer reminded us, each is given only as affected by the other—a world of 
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experience and reliable cognition, capable of inspection and verification, but offering us no access to 
subjects-in-themselves as objects-in-themselves.40 
 
P.F. Strawson advanced several much-discussed conceptual analyses. In Individuals, he distinguished 
between descriptive metaphysics which stays within Kantian parameters and ‘revisionary’ theories 
which tend to expand the world of things (seen and heard) and persons to include things thought but 
not experienced.41 Key to descriptive metaphysics is the reliability of perception, which Strawson 
explains in terms different from the classic empiricists who appeal to force or vivacity of impression as 
sensations’ mark of ultimacy. For perceptions to mark out individuals, they must be identified or located 
in the common space-time nexus; once located, an individual can be reidentified or cognitively 
recognized.42Having a material body is the condition for being perceived, so persons can be figured into 
a descriptive metaphysics, since they embodied. Since the ‘re’ in reidentification connotes some 
contribution from the subject, perception includes at least the ability to navigate relations of contiguity 
and succession. 
 
Strawson explicitly takes on Kant’s theory of cognition in The Bounds of Sense, showing just what sort of 
haircut is required to trim back his revisonary impulses and return him to the descriptive terrain of a 
“metaphysics of experience.” What Strawson hopes to fashion is an “austere” Kant who would meet the 
current need for a minimal account of experience without getting involved in fanciful strategies like 
transcendental arguments. “In order to set limits to coherent thinking, it is not necessary as Kant . . .  
attempted to do, to think both sides of those limits. It is enough to think up to them.”43 Still, Strawson 
admits, no one has come closer to that elusive goal.44 
 
Since Strawson’s account of perception focused on location in space and time, what it takes for 
perceptions to count as object, and a general tendency to introduce mind-talk sparingly, it is not 
surprising that in his revision of the Critique, he emphasizes the arguments of the Transcendental 
Aesthetic, the two Transcendental Deductions and the Analogies supplemented by the Refutation of 
Idealism. If one puts all these sections together, Kant’s argument apparently was that one has a world of 
objects with episodes of enduring being, change, and ordered interplay if and only if one is a self-
conscious subject: this is full frontal transcendental idealism, I gather. Strawson would reduce Kant’s  
last condition to the necessity of there being some logical reflexivity sufficient to discriminate objective 
from subjective time-orders, so that in general objectivity is correlated with temporal order.45 But does 
the representation “I think” that accompanies every objective experience point to anything other than a 
representation of logical unity, to an empirical I (B132)? This is the central ambiguity of the 
Transcendental Deduction which, according to Strawson, moves from a straightforward claim that an 
empirical I must be able to ascribe all experiences to herself to the need for a transcendental I, or logical 
reflexivity in general, that must be posited as a condition of empirical self-consciousness.46 Clearly the 
reduplication is questionable. What Strawson is at pains to read out of his account of Kant’s 
“problematic idealism” is an inflated metaphysical picture of a demiurgic knower somehow fashioning a 
world out of privileged intuitions of purely unknowable things-in-themselves.47 
 
Wilfred Sellars is quite technical in the close analyses he offers of detailed subjects, but very much a 
traditional philosopher in the ‘big-picture’ sense. He returns time and again to Kant not just because of 
the enticingly technical, perhaps faulty, details of Kant’s conceptual scheme but because in the wider 
sense he stands with Kant, wishing to endorse the truths turned up by empirical science but hanging 
onto a traditional humanistic or ‘manifest image’ when it comes to the moral and social situation of 
human beings.48 This need not mean we condemned forever to a stereoscopic vision, for, holding onto 
the irreducibility of  ‘ought’ to ‘is’, we can formulate the way intentions work to integrate single persons 
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into a community and thus approach a more holistic or ‘field-theory’ of human reality. In a more 
technical vein, he can say that his difference between the manifest image and the scientific is an 
appropriate translation of Kant’s phenomenalism (which he characterizes as ‘esse est percipi’) but at the 
same time he suggests that successor concepts from the former, especially those describing objects, 
have by our time crossed the line and are part of the scientific image.49 
 
In earlier essays, Sellars noted that the Kantian contrast of sensibility and understanding is not as simple 
as it first seems, and though the model of an intuition is the presentation of a singular item, some 
involve a complexity and spontaneity, making them more like concepts, while others are more obviously 
marked by receptivity.  Some originate in productive imagination, others in a unification of a sensible 
manifold; both have the logical structure of judgments. 50 In more developed presentations, Sellars 
observes that the intuiting of a sensible complex must involve at least all the pertinent physical 
categories and that it must be a synthesis effected in accordance with the laws of nature.51 But he 
departs from the historically dominant thread that views Kant as a phenomenalist who would construct 
a world by imposing concepts on mere sensations. Kant is a realist in maintaining there is an in-itself, a 
domain not dependent for its being on being represented; that complex intuitables cohere in one reality 
or system depends not just on their being synthesized according to rules, but their belonging to one 
complex intuitable individual, nature.52 When his notes say: “Truth and [= is] the objectively and 
intersubjectively valid belonging together of representables,” I take it he is offering a definition, and an 
account of knowledge that is both seriously realistic and seriously transcendental.53  In the background, 
Sellars depends on the function of the rational community as language-learners and language–teachers 
to demonstrate how a norm-governed community exists, where some in the community deploy ‘rules of 
action’ and others ‘rules of criticism’.  Reason’s ultimate imperative is a velvet-gloved: ‘This is how we 
say/do that’.54 
  
Finally we must mention recent thinking on the nature of transcendental arguments which has thrown 
light on Kant’s thinking, particularly in the Refutation of Idealism and the Second Analogy. Robert Stern 
considers how such arguments vary, depends on whether they try to justify truth-claims, in the most 
strenuous case, or mere facilitate conceptual analysis, in the least rigorous.55 The skeptic challenge Kant 
faced is open to a range of interpretation, from the epistemic skepticism Descartes posed with his 
universal doubt, to Hume’s difficulties, which may merely undercut the reliability of our knowledge 
claims or pose a more holistic challenge to integrity of our empirical cognition. Modern commentators 
tend to go with the third alternative, interpreting Kant’s transcendental argument as a systematic 
justification of the knowledge claims of experience or at least as a strenuous effort in that direction.56 
Hume’s attack on causality as neither a self-evident conceptual relation nor an idea derived from 
experience is what motivates Kant’s theory, and the mentalistic suppositions his transcendental theory 
introduces are the only way open to Kant to answer the double challenge posed by both rationalist and 
empiricist skepticism.57 Remarks Stern makes in passing on the job of the philosophical commentator 
shed some light on our difficulties with Kant: one can abstractly distinguish critical readings of a writer 
and charitable ones, but with Kant, apparently, we to need to simultaneously blue-pencil errors and 
offer charitable rewrites.  
 
Working with “the Crooked Wood of Humanity”58 
 
If the justification of our cognitive frameworks was the organizing question of the decades devoted to 
elaborating the Critiques, the question of humankind was that of the final decade of Kant’s writing. The 
spark of rationality may shape some basic endeavors and even take on an institutional guise of 
sovereignty or rule-governed arrangements, but in us humans taken singly, reason is often lodged with 
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rude companions: triviality, habit and convention on one side, superstition, fanaticism, and madness on 
the other.59 Kant was justly concerned with human improvement, but hardly naïve about the likelihood 
of the Enlightenment achieving its agenda. His starting point, the question of humanity—certainly not a 
“doctrine of humanity”—provides guidance and caution for subsequent thinkers.   
 
My remarks will be slender on this part of Kant’s reception, but one must mention two works that 
introduced simpler version of Kant’s thinking to contemporary audience and won for it some degree of 
acceptance. In 1786-1787, Karl Reinhold presented a popular discussion of Kant’s philosophy in a series 
of letters in Der Teutsche Merkur, which were later expanded and put in in book form. Kant expressed 
admiration for the relatively painless way they integrated the technicalities of his philosophy with 
broader enlightenment concern. Letters on the Kantian Philosophy secured Reinhold’s appointment to 
the University of Jena and made that institution the center of Kantian studies for the next two decades. 
Unlike the ‘Elementary Philosophy’ of the 1791 On the Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge, which 
systematically derived Kant’s technical views from a single principle, the Letters expand points Kant 
himself made about religion and the history of philosophy. In Reinhold’s eyes, Kant solved the quandary 
about faith and reason by putting the objects of religion beyond philosophical proof--or disproof. And if 
in Kant’s own view the Critique settled the dispute between rationalism and empiricism by negotiating a 
territorial compromise, Reinhold enlarges that move into a general technique that views the history of 
philosophy as a narrative of warring claims and negotiated settlements, or the resolution of antitheses 
into a synthesis.60 
 
Reinhold appealed to the “needs of the time” in presenting Critical Philosophy as particularly suited to 
decide the religious situation of the late Enlightenment, which put philosophical rationalism in 
contention with enthusiasm or faith without content.61 The poet Friedrich Schiller made a similar claim 
in a series of letters originally penned in 1793 for a Danish prince, but enlarged for publication in 1795 in 
Schiller’s journal The Graces. Reacting to the bloody course of the French Revolution but inspired by the 
ideal of a harmonious human spirit which he got from his reading of the Critique of the Power of 
Judgment, Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Man explicitly turned readers’ attention to a Kantian 
anthropology and to its fruits in education, politics, and morals.62  There are two impulses at work in the 
human as she comes from nature: a sensuous impulse and an intellectual one. Before freedom can 
emerge, there must be a period of training for freedom that involves not the subjection of the sensuous 
to the intellectual, but their unrestricted interplay in aesthetic imagination. The aesthetic realm involves 
the free creation of appearance, and only through this play at freedom is the human spirit readied for 
the real work of moral freedom.63 The poet exchanges the historical order of aesthetic and moral 
considerations in the Kantian Critiques but gains a narrative of human development more interesting 
than Kant’s dry list of powers: cognition, pleasure/displeasure, and desire. Humankind comes from 
nature and is destined to be a free self-creator or co-creator, but only by means of the conquest of self 
and appearances involved in aesthetic play. Schiller’s account lets Kant’s preoccupation with the 
epistemic and the question of objective grounding drop away, so that only human, political, and 
pedagogic concerns remain about the use of appearances and the prospect for human freedom. 
 
Phenomenology and fundamental ontology: Kant’s epistemic logic is simple: concepts are empty 
representations, or complexes of abstract signs; intuitions directly present content, whether that be 
sensuous or relational. The proposition is combinatory, either analysis of a complex into its components, 
or a synthetic aggregation of simples into something complex. Absent intuitions, concepts are empty, 
and absent concepts, sensations are blind. There is no doctrine of signs, no analysis of signification, and 
no consideration of meanings apart from the things of appearance. But matters would not stay this 
simple. Reinhold’s analysis of consciousness discovered three items: a subject, joined to an object, and 
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an awareness which both distinguishes and joins the other two. In 1812 Fichte maintained in his 
Transcendental Logic that thinking involves three elements: an image, an object which the image 
expresses, and space or matter for an intuition, with correspondingly more abstract elements at the 
level of a concept, which is an image of an image. The term ‘expression’ here indicates a semantical or 
intentional space between image and object. The same year, Hegel’s Science of Logic makes self-
thinking, self-specifying universal thought the motor for the development of cognitive content and 
insists that the individual thinker/actor (Kant’s subject of experience) is carried along on a universal 
current of thinking like a leaf on the stream.64  
The idealists thus opened the door to a marriage of logic and psychology that finds the universe of 
meanings constituted by subjective mental acts as well as sensory or experiential content. Husserl’s 
Logical Investigations (1900) explore the difference that consciousness and its modes of ‘taking’ (e.g., 
belief, disbelief, expectation, and assurance) make to the apprehension of entities on all levels, both 
things and items of thought. Husserl strikes an anti-Kantian pose, rejecting his designation of sensibility 
and understanding as essential human faculties; faculty-talk is just a whisker awaiting Ockham’s razor, 
as one can see if one pretends to explain dancing by a ‘faculty of dancing.’ In his view, Kant’s logic is but 
rewarmed Aristotle, and its claimed formality just the lack of objectivity that he and Herbart took to be 
the hallmark of the conceptual. Husserl puts his studies of meaning and reference, abstraction, intention 
objects, and phenomenology of knowledge under the rubric of pure logic as his way of distancing 
himself from empirical psychology. But he is confident that Kant’s focus on the objectivity of cognition 
oversimplified the account of human mental life.65   
There is more detail in the accounts of intentionality and phenomenology of knowledge which close the 
Investigations than can easily be summarized. ‘Intentionality’ connotes reference to an object of 
consciousness; it is spoken of as an ‘act of consciousness’ to indicate that it is constituted by the subject, 
not the object—there is no connotation of mental activity involved.66  Where Reinhold’s theory of 
conscious representation simply distinguished mental state and conscious awareness of it, as if 
consciousness was an immediate ‘black-box’ response to the presence of object, Husserl finds a nest of 
complex factors on both sides of the distinction. In any case of cognition, the subject may consider the 
contents fully or partially-- as occupying the foreground or the background, as characterized by 
complete predicates or incomplete ones—and though some parts of a presentation may carry the 
feature of objective reference, only as fully assembled is there an object of reference. On the side of 
consciousness, Husserl speaks of many-rayed and single-rayed intentionality; acts which present objects 
may be simple or complex, foundational or founded. Cognition is not a single thing; although there can 
be simple cases like naming that join perceptions to linguistic signs, even such simple cases are 
mediated by judgment or recognition (Erkennen).67 Everywhere in mental life, complexity is behind the 
scenes. Although Kant never approached the topic of linguistic signs, meaning and reference, 
incorporation of the findings of semantics or a study of intentionality can enrich his account of the 
conditions of objective cognition. Knowing is surrounded by a corona of attitudes (e.g., belief or doubt, 
expectation or hesitation) which are general and not just states of the empirical subject.  
Two years after publishing Being and Time, Martin Heidegger turned to Kant’s Critique to elucidate his 
ideas on fundamental ontology, human existence and temporality, sketched against their inauthentic 
counterparts that he locates in ‘metaphysics’ and the descriptive anthropology which is the subject of 
Kant’s late lectures and notes. Rejecting the dominant tradition of reading the Critique as legitimizing 
cognitive frameworks or offering a theory of experience, Heidegger describes Kant’s realm of interest as 
special metaphysics, or the relation of human reality to transcendence, “a transcendental ‘analytic’ of 
the subjectivity of the subject.”68 As Heidegger reads it, the Critique offers a reconstruction of human 
cognition that positively advances a third capacity in human reality as the ground of cognition besides 
14 
 
sensibility and understanding, viz., imagination; it is in fact the fundamental capacity, the hidden 
“common root” hinted at in the work’s first words.69 The three forms of intellectual synthesis in the A 
version of the Transcendental Deduction—apprehension, reproduction, and recognition--corresponds to 
the three modes of ecstatic temporality, so that time and imagination are virtually convertible terms.70 
The original interweaving of activity and receptivity that is imaginative synthesis is the temporization of 
time itself. Imagination is also the basis of the forms of sensible intuition, since the spatial relations of 
contiguity vis-à-vis being-at-a-distance and temporal succession are internally constructed, not 
furnished by experience. And the ultimate fit of the categories of relation (causality, substance/accident, 
and reciprocal interaction) is determined by their temporal application, as Kant described the process in 
the Schematism and the Analogies.71 
In 1929 Heidegger did not sharply distinguish between ontology, metaphysics, and transcendence. He 
thinks the lived unity of the three temporal dimensions is the meaning of transcendence, and human 
reality to be the essential uncovering of meaning. Time, imagination, and human reality mirror one 
another in the only possible metaphysics that can be constructed on Kantian foundations. But ultimately 
that Kantian foundation is static; even its sense of time is stationery, lacking the dynamic of movement 
imparted by futurity of the ever-lapsing present. For Heidegger, human reality is hyper-metaphysical, 
marked by a questioning of self and a knowledge that is interrogation, not restatement of fact. Care, 
anxiety, flight to futurity, and an ultimate hollowing out of the beings that mere experience displays is 
the true touchstone of being .72 These features point to a basic finitude at the core of being-- possibility 
without guarantee, a recapitulation perhaps of the spontaneity-receptivity of the tensed framework of 
being, but groundless or without permanence. Kant’s final question, What is man?, resounds in 
Heidegger in a way the author of Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View  could not anticipate, 
except perhaps in those troubling passages where madness and biological frailty are shown to factually 
bookend our rationality. 
Cassirer’s philosophy of culture: Early in his career, Cassirer sought to integrate the discoveries of 
relativity theory and quantum physics into a Kantian philosophy of science. From 1923 until his death in 
America, Cassirer elaborated a philosophy of symbolic forms. He points to the embodied intelligence of 
the human community and the fluid creativity of the intellectual, social, and communicative structures 
they embody, perhaps something akin to Wittgenstein’s ‘forms of life.’ Cassirer’s reflections on 
language, myth, religion, art, history and science assign a fundamental but plastic creativity to human 
intelligence and sociality. His theory incorporates Kant’s view of overlapping human powers of 
cognition, pleasure and desire, and the ideal of a subjective harmonization of understanding and 
imagination that he posed as the definition of aesthetic judgment.73 
The various symbolic forms Cassirer investigates have a common function, expression or “configuration 
toward being,” most readily apparent in the flexible linguistic sign that designates without copying a 
single item, and is not a receptive impression but the impressing the mark of our spontaneity upon 
variable contents.74 It is difficult at first for Cassirer’s reader to discern both the unity and diversity of 
the ‘forms’ he studies, for each one distills the whole of the human reach for meaning but is at the same 
time constituted by its difference from the others. Each single form posits the whole of consciousness.75 
From the author’s side, one can explain the multiplicity from Cassirer’s allegiance to a broader 
methodology of ‘Copernican revolution’ that Cassirer sees in the unfolding of the Kantian corpus, where 
a progressive identification of different functions of human reality specifies the order of investigations 
and works Kant produces, not some preexisting list of different substances or subject-matters. The 
critical-idealist project of articulating the human spirit came to Kant gradually, unlike Pascal’s one-night 
stand of fiery vision from beyond.76  
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One can best see how a symbolic form functions if one turns from the cognitive domain, where we think 
we understand what we are doing, to more archaic forms such as myth and religion. It is not the case 
that we lift empirical contents from their proper context and drop them into alien dress. Our whole 
experience is distilled in the mythical form, and it is not a question of our capturing the content or the 
adequacy of the capture, but of the quality of attention we direct to phenomena. Humans have objects 
only insofar as they inhabit these life forms.77 In their very plurality and irreducibility—what could be 
more different than the spheres of art and science, or history and mythology?—they form an interlinked 
chain, not of substances, but of functions.78 
Public intellectuals: Two recent thinkers who take up Kant’s project of insistently questioning the place 
of humankind achieved public voices considerably more influential than academics usually attain. Michel 
Foucault submitted the usual works for the doctorat d’Etat in 1964, Madness and Civilization and a 
translation of Kant’s Anthropology. His committee recognized the core of an independent work in the 
translation’s Introduction; after months of meditation on Diego Velázquez’s Las Meninas, Foucault 
transformed it into Les mots et les choses.79 What is novel in Foucault’s treatment of human culture is 
the suggestion that the human subject is absent in the very disciplines and activities that support human 
life, as the painter suggests in placing the ‘real’ subject--the Infanta’s mirrored royal parents or the 
viewer who should appear in that mirror—outside of the painting and putting the entourage in its 
center. Our life is supported by currents of thought and activity which are impersonal, pre-reflexive, and 
impervious to philosophical analysis. Language, biology, and economic exchange are the ways we 
currently understand our reality, but the thoughts of individuals and the actions of identifiable 
communities sink to intellectual insignificance, for their intelligibility resides elsewhere in autonomous 
and unmanageable institutions of knowledge that surround the human stage. As in the Velázquez 
painting, the sovereign subject is missing even in the midst of those academic ‘maids of honor’ who 
curate our understanding of human existence. In ceaselessly ordering and reordering things, imagination 
and understanding--or “representation represented”--generate shifting schemata of knowledge, micro-
histories that fail to exhibit a center or an enduring reality.80 
What is Kantian in this picture? There is no trace of Kant’s constitutive reason, no insistence that the life 
of cognition, desire, and pleasure are regulated by some normative power. Led instead by the 
Anthropology, Foucault finds that individuals and their capacities are randomly placed in situations 
where a mixture of rationality and irrationality prevails, where attempts to address human needs are 
compromised by limiting, if not antagonistic, tendencies. The peculiarity of human culture, underscored 
by both Kant and Foucault, is the contingency of prevailing arrangements or the historical conditions 
that have brought them about, and the possibility that other ways of arranging human affairs might 
produce better outcomes. That morals are communicated (and undermined) by situations where 
manners or custom are the main educator is almost a strike-through that Kant writes across his own 
rigorous prescriptivism. That he prized Königsberg as the ideal confluence of culture, commerce and 
education—almost a second Athens—brings smiles to lips of many readers.81 Both Kant and Foucault 
value the way that ephemeral cultural arrangements transmit normative reason precisely because of the 
oddity of the arrangement. Perhaps Foucault presents a reprise of Schiller’s vision of an ultimate 
harmonization of sensuous and intellectual human capacities, led not by the individual poet’s (or 
ideologue’s) imagination, but by the incessant novelty of mass culture and communication. 
I want to conclude with a look at Hannah Arendt. Both as a thinker in her own right and as one of 
Heidegger’s major heirs, she casts a critical look at the culture and practice of philosophy as it has 
evolved since Greek times and focuses on the exceptional character of thinking, inevitably viewed in 
modern times through the Kantian lens that marks cognition, willing, and judging as discrete functions of 
reason. In her view, Kant was aware of the difference between reason and intellect (Verstand), but 
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chose the latter and pursued questions that could be answered, deferring the challenge of reason and 
its peculiar search for meaning--or thinking.82 Arendt never viewed thinking as anything utilitarian or 
narrowly focused on finite tasks or contingent ends. Early on she distinguished political action, the 
individual’s self-defining deed performed in the communal theater of politics, from administration, 
recognizing that reason is peculiarly about itself and self-actualizing.83 
Arendt accentuates the self-concern and self-interrogation that are the hallmarks of reason by looking 
back to the Platonic Socrates and the peculiarly conscientious way he confronted the sophists’ sense of 
expediency and relativity. A Socratic self is a ‘two in one’: an actor in a situation and an observer 
endowed with aims and values; to live an honest life is simply to keep the two yoked or harmonious. The 
rational conduct of life demands a person not just ‘do the necessary business,’ but more or less be an 
achieved congruence of possibilities, deeds, and ideals.84 Kant’s abstract reason imposes the same 
demands on itself: it decrees that unity shall be found in difference, harmony in disharmony, universality 
in infinite diversity of detail, and singleness of willing amidst a diaspora of situated choices.  
Willing stands opposite mere thinking and remembrance in that its aim is not merely to reflect the world 
or unify its image, but to transform it--to turn a possible future into a ‘now’. Thinking requires flight 
from the world, some refuge from ceaseless happening, whereas willing requires world engagement.85 
Post-Kantian German philosophy turned what for Kant was a simple difference of jurisdiction in reason’s 
rule into something momentous, independent, and coercive. From Hegel’s self-moving concept  to  
Schelling’s freedom as assertion of will in the face of nature’s order, to Schopenhauer’s principle of 
irrational facticity , all the way to Heidegger’s Gelassenheit (the will not to will), recent European 
thought embraced an agent of historical movement beyond individual rational control or beyond the 
assessment of conscience.86  Arendt died before she could produce a volume on judging, but it seems 
clear her treatment would have gone beyond the limited cases of reflexive unification under concepts 
that Kant considered in the Critique of the Power of Judgment.  Thinking is essentially judgmental, self-
reflective and evaluative. Nowhere did Arendt display her Kantian bent more clearly than in her 
characterization of Adolf Eichmann, the man who thought he was a good Kantian because he followed 
orders, as simply lacking the capacity to think.87 
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